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Health Care Reform Redux

by Geoff Johnson


Like many present-day law­mak­ers in the United States, the ancient Baby­lon­ian king Ham­murabi gave at least some thought to the ques­tion of how to pay for health care. One sec­tion of the famous Code of Ham­murabi detailed what the fall 2009 issue of Lapham’s Quar­terly cheek­ily referred to as a “fee sched­ule” for doc­tors in the 18th cen­tury BCE. For suc­cess­fully employ­ing a “bronze lancet” to treat a severe wound, Baby­lon­ian doc­tors were enti­tled to a set remu­ner­a­tion. If the patient were a “gen­tle­man” he was to pay ten shekels of sil­ver. The son of a poor man would owe just five (thus fees were in part tied to one’s abil­ity to pay), and a gen­tle­man whose ser­vant needed care was to pay the doc­tor two shekels (an early ver­sion of our present day employment-based health insur­ance sys­tem?). These lat­ter pro­vi­sions might strike us as almost mod­ern, but the code took a more dra­con­ian stance when it came to deal­ing with med­ical mal­prac­tice. Doc­tors who killed or maimed a patient while oper­at­ing did not end up in court fac­ing a civil suit as they might today; they sim­ply had their hands cut off.

Nearly four thou­sand years after Hammurabi’s laws were first carved into stone, physi­cians have con­sid­er­ably more to work with than bronze lancets when it comes to med­ical tech­nol­ogy, but the United States has yet to fig­ure out a decent way to ensure that every­one has access to med­ical care and a means to pay for it. The Patient Pro­tec­tion and Afford­able Care Act recently passed by Con­gress and signed by Pres­i­dent Barack Obama pur­ports to be the begin­ning of a long-term solu­tion to that prob­lem, and it comes after a year-long fight that sucked nearly all of the oxy­gen out of main­stream polit­i­cal debate in this country.

The terms of the health care dis­cus­sion, such as it was, were heav­ily cir­cum­scribed from the out­set. While a single-payer sys­tem — some ver­sion of which has been adopted in basi­cally every other fully indus­tri­al­ized nation — has polled extremely well in pub­lic opin­ion sur­veys for years, any­thing akin to “Medicare for all” was deemed “polit­i­cally impos­si­ble” from the out­set (the obvi­ous rea­son being that it was anath­ema to the enor­mously prof­itable and pow­er­ful insur­ance indus­try and its polit­i­cal back­ers, gen­er­ally went unspo­ken). Dur­ing his major address to con­gress on health care last Sep­tem­ber, Obama “tri­an­gu­lated” in a highly cyn­i­cal fash­ion when he likened single-payer to absurd con­ser­v­a­tive pro­pos­als that would end employer-based insur­ance and force indi­vid­u­als to buy insur­ance on their own, label­ing both inter­est­ing but imprac­ti­cal ideas. Despite its pop­u­lar­ity and the fact that a House single-payer bill has been co-sponsored by over ninety mem­bers of con­gress in recent years, the cor­po­rate media pro­vided lit­tle report­ing or com­men­tary on this option.

While single-payer advo­cates were not even offered a seat at the nego­ti­at­ing table, major stake­hold­ers in the cur­rent for-profit health care sys­tem were cen­tral play­ers from the begin­ning as the Obama admin­is­tra­tion sought to avoid the ire of the insur­ance and phar­ma­ceu­ti­cal indus­tries that had helped derail health care reform in 1993 – 94. America’s Health Insur­ance Plans (AHIP), the trade group of the health insur­ance indus­try, was in reg­u­lar touch with the admin­is­tra­tion and promised to work for reform but sat on the fence for months before decid­ing to oppose the Demo­c­ra­tic pro­posal. This deci­sion angered the Obama admin­is­tra­tion and led to a war of words between the White House and the insur­ance indus­try. In the end, how­ever, the two main demands of the indus­try (every­one would be required to buy health insur­ance, no government-run “pub­lic option” to com­pete with pri­vate insur­ance) were met by the leg­is­la­tion signed by the president.

Mean­while, the phar­ma­ceu­ti­cal com­pa­nies’ trade group PhRMA, led by for­mer Repub­li­can con­gress­man Billy Tauzin, struck a deal with the White House last sum­mer under which Big Pharma would agree to $80 bil­lion in cost-cutting mea­sures in the years ahead. In exchange the White House promised that it would not seek to lower pre­scrip­tion drug prices, an issue on which Obama had cam­paigned in 2008. PhRMA even­tu­ally sup­ported the reform leg­is­la­tion with an expen­sive ad cam­paign, even reviv­ing the fic­tional cou­ple “Harry and Louise” whose com­mer­cials had helped to derail the Clin­ton reform effort but who now argued that we could “get the job done this time.”

In the Sen­ate, con­trol of the leg­is­la­tion was ini­tially handed over to the con­ser­v­a­tive Demo­c­rat from Mon­tana, Max Bau­cus, who had received over $1.4 mil­lion in cam­paign con­tri­bu­tions from the health and insur­ance sec­tors dur­ing the 2008 elec­tion cycle. Bau­cus and five other mem­bers of the Sen­ate Finance Com­mit­tee (includ­ing three Repub­li­cans) were tasked with work­ing out a com­pro­mise bill. The GOP made the (rather obvi­ous) cal­cu­la­tion that it was not in their polit­i­cal inter­ests to help Obama pass a mas­sive, bipar­ti­san makeover of health care and as such embarked on a course of staunch oppo­si­tion while pay­ing lip ser­vice to the idea that they were nego­ti­at­ing. Sev­eral months were lost in the process, and dur­ing the sum­mer recess a pop­u­lar back­lash against the sup­posed gov­ern­ment “takeover” of health care exploded on the polit­i­cal scene, with the half-term ex-governor of Alaska arguably dri­ving the dis­cus­sion more than the pres­i­dent. The back­lash — which undoubt­edly was given exces­sive atten­tion by the media — con­sisted of a potent mix of gen­uine, grass­roots, anti-government con­ser­vatism (and lib­er­tar­i­an­ism) and cor­po­rate astro­turf­ing led by for­mer House Major­ity Leader Dick Armey’s group Free­dom Works. The Obama admin­is­tra­tion was clearly caught off guard and never really regained con­trol of the debate.

This loss of con­trol was per­haps nowhere more evi­dent than in the dis­cus­sion of the pub­lic option, a fairly lim­ited and inad­e­quate reform which would have been avail­able only to a small per­cent­age of the pop­u­la­tion (and only if they wanted it), but which was quickly spo­ken of by the right as though it were culled from the pages of Mein Kampf. Many of Obama’s sup­port­ers on the left, mean­while, came to view the pub­lic option as the holy grail of reform, tak­ing lit­tle notice of the fact that it was never described with any real speci­ficity and could well have proved a fail­ure if imple­mented and sig­nif­i­cantly set back the cause of single-payer to which most pro­gres­sives are com­mit­ted. Adding to the con­fu­sion, main­stream media out­lets gen­er­ally rep­re­sented the pro­posed pub­lic option as unpop­u­lar despite the fact that sur­veys rou­tinely showed that more than 50 per­cent of the coun­try sup­ported it. Obama oblig­ingly mouthed his sup­port for the pub­lic option to avoid anger­ing his lib­eral base more than nec­es­sary, but it seems likely he aban­doned the idea of includ­ing it in the leg­is­la­tion early on, per­haps as part of a quid pro quo with indus­try groups.

Scott Brown’s sur­prise vic­tory in the Jan­u­ary spe­cial elec­tion to fill the late Teddy Kennedy’s Sen­ate seat seemed to kill the pos­si­bil­ity of reform, but ulti­mately the Demo­c­ra­tic lead­er­ship — fully rec­og­niz­ing that fail­ure to fin­ish any leg­is­la­tion would have been polit­i­cally dis­as­trous — was able to craft a route to pas­sage based in large mea­sure on the orig­i­nal, mod­er­ate Sen­ate bill reported out of Baucus’s finance com­mit­tee. Lib­er­als cheered, hail­ing the bill as the great­est domes­tic pol­icy achieve­ment since Medicare and Med­ic­aid, while many con­ser­v­a­tives sug­gested that the bill was essen­tially the begin­ning of the end of free­dom in the United States

In real­ity it’s extremely dif­fi­cult to say what the effects of reform will be on pub­lic pol­icy and on Amer­i­can pol­i­tics in the long run. In terms of what the pol­icy will actu­ally do there are sev­eral issues at play. Mea­sures which will sig­nif­i­cantly expand the num­ber of peo­ple who have access to Med­ic­aid, allow young peo­ple to stay on their par­ents’ plans until age twenty-six, and end dis­crim­i­na­tion based on pre-existing con­di­tions (among oth­ers) are unam­bigu­ously ben­e­fi­cial assum­ing they are actu­ally imple­mented as adver­tised. Despite threats of repeal if and when the Repub­li­cans retake the gov­ern­ment, and forth­com­ing con­sti­tu­tional chal­lenges by con­ser­v­a­tive attor­ney gen­er­als in a dozen or so states, it seems extremely unlikely that the law will be taken off the books by Con­gress or the courts, and as such a num­ber of pro­vi­sions will likely begin to have a demon­stra­bly pos­i­tive effect even before the 2012 election.

More threat­en­ing to the future of the leg­is­la­tion will be busi­ness efforts to fight its imple­men­ta­tion through legal chan­nels while also fight­ing a con­tin­ued pub­lic rela­tions war via adver­tis­ing. Accord­ing to the Wall Street Jour­nal, the US Cham­ber of Com­merce is plan­ning on spend­ing $50 mil­lion attack­ing health care reform and attempt­ing “to unseat vul­ner­a­ble Democ­rats who voted for it.” The Cham­ber also plans to take legal action if and when they dis­agree with imple­men­ta­tion of the law. Crit­ics have remarked that the leg­is­la­tion is full of loop­holes, and much of the uncer­tainty about the law going for­ward stems from the fact that the mean­ing of some of the key pro­vi­sions will likely be decided in the courts. We’ve already seen a pre­view of this lawyerly strat­egy when the insur­ance indus­try briefly tried to argue (per­haps cor­rectly) that the law did not actu­ally require them to pro­vide cov­er­age to chil­dren with pre­ex­ist­ing con­di­tions this year, as had been assumed. The indus­try quickly backed down from that argu­ment after an out­cry, but it’s a safe assump­tion that high-priced cor­po­rate attor­neys will be look­ing for any legal loop­holes that, for exam­ple, allow insur­ance com­pa­nies to cover indi­vid­u­als poorly or not at all.

In spite of indus­try con­cerns, the con­ven­tional wis­dom is that most health care com­pa­nies will ben­e­fit from the new law. The New York Times reported on April 9 that the leg­is­la­tion will likely prove to be a boon for health care stocks, as com­pa­nies like CVS Care­mark and Quest Diag­nos­tics are expected to profit hand­somely from increased pre­scrip­tion drug sales and med­ical tests respec­tively. Insur­ance com­pa­nies may face more dif­fi­cul­ties once they have to cover peo­ple with pre-existing con­di­tions at which point, as one health ana­lyst told the Times, we’ll have to see if “they price these things so that they can avoid los­ing money” (that seems likely!). Despite their ear­lier oppo­si­tion, AHIP has now, accord­ing to Time mag­a­zine, signed on in sup­port to make “sure the new law suc­ceeds beyond most expec­ta­tions,” though AHIP and its health care indus­try mem­bers no doubt define “suc­cess” dif­fer­ently than do many of the sup­port­ers and intended ben­e­fi­cia­ries of the bill.

In polit­i­cal terms, the health care debate has ener­gized both the new Tea Party Move­ment and the Demo­c­ra­tic base. Given the mod­er­ate if not con­ser­v­a­tive nature of the reform — which, as Clin­ton admin­is­tra­tion Labor Sec­re­tary Robert Reich has pointed out, is sim­i­lar in cer­tain respects to pro­pos­als made by Richard Nixon — it says a great deal about pol­i­tics in the age of Obama that many lib­er­als are now mobi­liz­ing around what they see as an enor­mous pol­icy suc­cess while the Tea Party and the GOP are mobi­liz­ing to roll back the ris­ing tide of fas­cism, or some­thing. Regard­less, for the next few years if not beyond we shouldn’t be sur­prised to see con­tin­ued, intense grass­roots energy directed at health care reform from both the right and liberal-left.

To what ends that energy will be directed is arguably a more dif­fi­cult ques­tion. Per­haps in part because of the fierce inten­sity of the debate, many pun­dits speak and write as though the cur­rent bat­tle lines for the health care debate will per­sist indef­i­nitely. How­ever, if his­tory is any guide when it comes to major social leg­is­la­tion, that likely will not be the case. When the Social Secu­rity Act was passed in 1935, it was not par­tic­u­larly pop­u­lar with FDR’s labor base (which was largely indif­fer­ent to the very idea of social insur­ance) nor with the Repub­li­can oppo­si­tion (some of whom made ref­er­ence to a threat to “the integrity of our insti­tu­tions” and warned of “the lash of the dic­ta­tor”). The act held to the racial and gen­der stric­tures of its time and excluded the major­ity of African Amer­i­cans and women from the old-age insur­ance por­tion of the plan (the NAACP actu­ally tes­ti­fied against the bill). Over time, how­ever, Social Secu­rity became more inclu­sive, and was not only accepted by the next Repub­li­can pres­i­dent, Dwight Eisen­hower, but was expanded sig­nif­i­cantly by his admin­is­tra­tion, and labor unions and other pro­gres­sive groups would come to defend Social Secu­rity as the bul­wark of the (admit­tedly lim­ited) Amer­i­can wel­fare state.

The story with Medicare is some­what sim­i­lar in terms of shift­ing pol­i­tics. In the early 1960s, future Repub­li­can stan­dard bearer Ronald Rea­gan railed against Medicare on behalf of the Amer­i­can Med­ical Asso­ci­a­tion and argued that it was a step­ping stone to social­ism. He had changed his tune, how­ever, by the time of the 1980 elec­tion when incum­bent Jimmy Carter tried unsuc­cess­fully to make an issue of his past state­ments in oppo­si­tion to the by-then-popular pro­gram. George W. Bush and a Repub­li­can con­gress added an out­landishly expen­sive pre­scrip­tion drug ben­e­fit to Medicare in 2003, and in August of last year Repub­li­can National Com­mit­tee chair­man Michael Steele argued in a Wash­ing­ton Post op-ed that “we need to pro­tect Medicare…” Many pro­gres­sives of the mid-1960s viewed Medicare and Med­ic­aid as poor sub­sti­tutes for their real goal of a national health insur­ance plan, but now “Medicare for all” is the ral­ly­ing cry for many on the left.

A con­sid­er­a­tion of even the most basic vari­ables demon­strates how dif­fi­cult it is to pre­dict the future pol­i­tics of Oba­macare. While the leg­is­la­tion is not in fact a gov­ern­ment takeover of health care, it is per­ceived that way by many (on both sides of the debate). Will this per­cep­tion con­tinue to hold in the future? How pop­u­lar will the reform be in five to ten years, and which aspects will be pop­u­lar and which less so? If many view the pro­gram as suc­cess­ful (or as a fail­ure), will it be because of a belief that the gov­ern­ment took a larger role in the health care sys­tem, or because they left the pri­vate sys­tem largely as is, merely tweak­ing around the edges? If health care costs con­tinue to go up, as is likely, will that be blamed on the fed­eral gov­ern­ment, the states, the insur­ance com­pa­nies, or some com­bi­na­tion thereof? We can­not know the answers to these ques­tions at this point, but it’s entirely pos­si­ble that lib­er­als will be lament­ing the fail­ure of reform ten years from now while con­ser­v­a­tives will have decided it wasn’t so bad. Or not.

For those of us on the left, it’s impos­si­ble to be happy with the Patient Pro­tec­tion and Afford­able Care Act or the way the process unfolded, though one can hardly be sur­prised by the out­come. The leg­is­la­tion seems to have fur­ther entrenched the role of for-profit insur­ance in the health care sys­tem which, in the long run, will inevitably con­tinue to drive up costs as cor­po­rate prof­its are pri­or­i­tized over peo­ple. The indus­try bought polit­i­cal access and helped write the bill to sig­nif­i­cantly suit its own inter­ests, and single-payer advo­cates had no real oppor­tu­nity to artic­u­late the case for a Euro­pean or Cana­dian style sys­tem in the course of a lengthy national health care debate the likes of which may not come again for many years.

On the other hand, the new law does seem to cod­ify (at least in the­ory) the prin­ci­ple that access to afford­able health care is a right, not a priv­i­lege, of all Amer­i­cans. This leg­is­la­tion will almost cer­tainly not deliver on that promise, and a decade or two from now it’s quite likely that Con­gress and a new pres­i­dent will be dis­cussing health care all over again as costs spi­ral wildly out of con­trol. At that point, hav­ing per­haps inter­nal­ized the notion that every­one deserves to have cov­er­age, even more Amer­i­cans (and more leg­is­la­tors) might be open to the idea that a single-payer sys­tem is most effi­cient at con­tain­ing costs while still pro­vid­ing every­one with access to care. Even if we get to that point even­tu­ally — a very big if — drug and health insur­ance com­pa­nies will rake in a whole lot of shekels in the mean­time, and tens of thou­sands will die because they could not afford to pay the man or woman with the bronze lancet that could have saved their life.

Posted by Geoff Johnson on May 25th, 2010 and filed under Political Analysis. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0. You can leave a response by filling following comment form or trackback to this entry from your site

1 Response for “Health Care Reform Redux”

  1. […] Brace for Health Care Reform-Related Cost Increases but Remain …PR Newswire (press release)GC Advo­cate -CFO.com Mag­a­zine -Busi­ness Insur­anceall 133 news […]

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