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The Militarization of Crowd Control

by Justin Rogers-Cooper


The Group of 20 (G-20) Sum­mit protests in Pitts­burgh this past Sep­tem­ber were a thresh­old event. Not only were pro­tes­tors detained and beaten by the police, but they were also sub­jected to new military-grade tech­nolo­gies that have pushed the bound­aries of what kinds of actions are per­mis­si­ble for con­trol­ling large crowds of pro­tes­tors, unruly or not. This fact, how­ever, has been largely ignored by the main­stream media for sev­eral rea­sons. First of all, the com­mer­cial media ignores sto­ries it can’t spin into easy and famil­iar nar­ra­tives of good and bad, right and wrong. The story of the G-20 protests and the sub­se­quent police bru­tal­ity that took place dur­ing those protests does not match the facile opti­mism of polit­i­cal cam­paign speeches, upbeat adver­tis­ing, and enter­tain­ment spec­ta­cles. Instead, the

se cor­po­rate media out­lets spin sim­plis­tic sto­ries that rede­fine dis­or­ders as iso­lated dis­rup­tions or excep­tional “tragedies.” Another alter­na­tive inter­pre­ta­tion of these national “tragedies” and dis­rup­tions is pos­si­ble by con­nect­ing together what they have in com­mon. The actions of secu­rity forces in Pitts­burgh in 2009, New Orleans in 2005, and the Repub­li­can National Con­ven­tion in New York in 2004 all reveal the increas­ingly mil­i­tant poli­cies of the home­land secu­rity state since Sep­tem­ber 11. By trac­ing police actions back to those poli­cies it’s pos­si­ble to more sub­stan­tively inter­pret the mean­ing of the Pitts­burgh protests and what they mean for the future of crowd control.

The poli­cies of the new home­land secu­rity state reflect a con­sen­sus between law enforce­ment offi­cials and the mil­i­tary about the use of new tech­no­log­i­cal weapons against cit­i­zens and non-citizens. The Pitts­burgh secu­rity forces used non-lethal weapons to dis­perse crowds, includ­ing the Long Range Acoustic Device, or the LRAD. This large sonic gun radi­ates short bursts of sound waves that are audi­ble over very long dis­tances. Fir­ing it up-close cre­ates a very loud and pow­er­ful noise that is capa­ble of caus­ing hear­ing loss and great lev­els of pain. These LRAD devices have pre­vi­ously been used in Iraq for sim­i­lar pur­poses. It was also used as a defen­sive weapon on the cruise ship Seabourn Spirit in 20

terror_LRAD Pittsburgh_color

A pro­tes­tor at the Group of 20 Meet­ing in Pitts­burgh, Sep­tem­ber 24, 2009. The Police Vehi­cle seen here is equipped with a Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD)

05 off the coast of Soma­lia to fend off a group of pirates. The pirates were repelled despite hav­ing rocket-propelled grenades and machine guns. And now the use of the weapon domes­ti­cally against non-violent crowds of Amer­i­can cit­i­zens is tak­ing place, arguably not only a vio­la­tion of their civil lib­er­ties but also a vio­la­tion of basic human rights.

The device is meant to inflict “non-lethal injury.” In this sense it echoes the “enhanced inter­ro­ga­tion” tech­niques that the mil­i­tary uses to tor­ture enemy com­bat­ants in places like Iraq, Afghanistan, and the US prison at Guan­tanamo Bay. Like the Taser gun, which has become pop­u­lar with local police depart­ments, the LRAD is yet another law enforce­ment weapon that’s sup­pos­edly non-lethal but also rel­a­tively unsta­ble in live tri­als. Like Preda­tor spy planes that shoot Hell­fire mis­siles at sus­pected tar­gets in Pak­istan, the Taser and the LRAD are weapons that fun­da­men­tally change the new laws of secu­rity pow­ers. These weapons mod­u­late wide ranges of before unheard of force in order to sub­due indi­vid­u­als and crowds.

Equally prob­lem­atic is the increase in the use of the 1968 Riot Act to crim­i­nal­ize the use of social net­work­ing tech­nolo­gies such as Face­book and Twit­ter. Local author­i­ties in New York took major steps to cir­cum­scrib­ing the effects of pub­lic protests in 2004 through mass arrests, but they went a step fur­ther in Pitts­burgh by tar­get­ing the use of com­mu­ni­ca­tions devices by pro­test­ers. Elliot Madison’s arrest by the Penn­syl­va­nia State Police in Pitts­burgh for Tweet­ing the loca­tion of police to pro­test­ers is symp­to­matic of a cam­paign to pre­vent crowds from intel­li­gently orga­niz­ing. The sub­se­quent search of Madison’s apart­ment by an FBI counter-terrorism unit con­fis­cated pic­tures of Marx and Lenin as evi­dence. A grand jury trial is still open. The police are using the Riot Act as legal prece­dent. This is an orches­trated attack on legit­i­mate forms of polit­i­cal dissent.

These actions send a chill­ing mes­sage to poten­tial polit­i­cal activists and every­day cit­i­zen pro­test­ers, that pub­lic author­ity will use any means nec­es­sary to con­trol indi­vid­u­als and crowds. This includes autho­riz­ing the use of vio­lent new instru­ments of con­trol. Each new tool reflects a unique tech­no­log­i­cal break­through in the sci­ence of con­trol­ling human bod­ies effi­ciently. These on-going assaults are tol­er­ated because of lit­tle com­pro­mises that indi­vid­u­als make about the social con­tract and the eth­i­cal respon­si­bil­i­ties one has toward the suf­fer­ing of oth­ers. Each lit­tle com­pro­mise has required a denial that returns as a form of fear and anx­i­ety in much of the Amer­i­can pub­lic. Not coin­ci­dently, the Amer­i­can pub­lic has reacted pas­sively against these new tech­nolo­gies of immo­bi­liz­ing bod­ies. Anx­i­ety par­a­lyzes one’s abil­ity to think clearly about the real move­ments in Amer­i­can politics.

These move­ments reflect essen­tial changes in the tech­nol­ogy of crowd con­trol. Com­pa­nies that pro­vide emer­gency train­ing for local author­i­ties use com­puter sim­u­la­tions that con­struct sce­nar­ios of nat­ural dis­as­ters, fires, ter­ror­ism, and civil dis­tur­bances. A sim­u­la­tion video adver­tised on YouTube boasts that every block in New York has been dig­i­tally repro­duced for that train­ing. The expres­sion of these poli­cies in phys­i­cal con­fronta­tions reveals an orga­nized, method­i­cal, and poten­tially dehu­man­iz­ing approach toward all bod­ies present in declared “emer­gency” and “dis­as­ter” zones. In much of the mil­i­tary lit­er­a­ture, for instance, protests are also clas­si­fied as civil dis­tur­bances. Civil dis­tur­bances are, in turn, defined as man-made dis­as­ters. As a result, strate­gic responses to nat­ural dis­as­ters and protest dis­as­ters are very sim­i­lar. They involve sus­pend­ing civil lib­er­ties for the pur­poses of pro­tect­ing pub­lic order and pri­vate prop­erty. Crowds are “man­aged,” whether they have gath­ered to loot, com­mit vio­lence, or just to protest.

They are also man­aged if they become dis­placed by cli­mate cat­a­stro­phes or eco­nomic incen­tives. In 2006, the Hal­libur­ton sub­sidiary KBR received a $385 mil­lion con­tract for tem­po­rary deten­tion and pro­cess­ing cen­ters. At the time, this con­tract reminded some inde­pen­dent jour­nal­ists of the REX-84 “readi­ness exer­cise” that Oliver North spear­headed dur­ing the Rea­gan admin­is­tra­tion. The exer­cise imag­ined that 400,000 migrants from Mex­ico entered the US and became an uncon­trol­lable pop­u­la­tion. The plan called for all 400,000 to be detained. The Fed­eral Emer­gency Man­age­ment Agency (FEMA) would be respon­si­ble for stor­ing them. As immi­grants, they would not be sub­ject to con­sti­tu­tional protection.

Like the KBR cen­ters con­tracted in 2006, the camps would detain, house, and process bod­ies. The United States has pow­ers to cre­ate domes­tic intern­ment camps just as all other state gov­ern­ments do. The World War II Japan­ese intern­ment camps pro­vide evi­dence that the United States can detain tens of thou­sands of bod­ies after declar­ing an emergency.

In 1982, for­mer FEMA head Louis Giuf­frida drafted an exec­u­tive order for con­ti­nu­ity of gov­ern­ment plan­ning in the event of nation-wide insur­gency of African-American mil­i­tants. The order called for “mar­tial law” and “sus­pen­sion of the Con­sti­tu­tion.” The REX-84 camps and the Japan­ese inter­ment camps are large-scale prece­dents for Guan­tanamo Bay. State author­ity rests on emer­gency pow­ers in all three cases. They are large-scale prece­dents for the 2,000 pro­test­ers detained at Pier 57 dur­ing the 2004 New York Repub­li­can Convention.

Pop­u­la­tions often express them­selves through spe­cific, col­lec­tive iden­ti­ties. One such form of iden­tity is crowds. Crowds are inher­ently unsta­ble and very pow­er­ful. They thus make the state vul­ner­a­ble. Protests and pro­test­ers acquire dis­pro­por­tion­ate power when they form crowds. Crowds can make demands that elec­tions can­not. Crowds can use force that can­not be undone. Crowds can shift polit­i­cal sen­ti­ment for author­ity by expos­ing the ero­sion of power, by embar­rass­ing author­i­ties, or by being sub­jected to police bru­tal­ity. Crowds can visu­ally demon­strate the vio­lence of the state against cer­tain ideas. As crowds, they have the power to draw emo­tions and media to ideas and bod­ies pos­si­bly sub­ject to cen­sor­ship or derision.

The col­lec­tive power of assem­bled bod­ies can over­whelm repel­lent police tech­nolo­gies, includ­ing lethal weapons. Crowds can over­whelm state forces through the sheer power of num­bers. A group as orga­nized and ener­gized as an Ohio State Buck­eye foot­ball crowd could eas­ily occupy the state capi­tol build­ing in Colum­bus. This is why crowd con­trol was essen­tial for the pro­tec­tion of Pres­i­dent Barack Obama in Pitts­burgh. This is also why move­ments that encour­age var­i­ous kinds of crowds have suc­cess­ful records against state forces. An exam­ple might be the Mont­gomery Bus Boy­cott in 1955 – 56 and the Berlin Wall crowds in 1989.

In response to the power of these crowds, states can declare and enforce mar­tial law. Dur­ing mar­tial law, exec­u­tive author­ity resides under the direc­tion of local civil author­i­ties. This is the sin­gle most impor­tant aspect of under­stand­ing mar­tial law. Ele­ments of the mil­i­tary main­tain “liaisons” with fed­eral, state, and munic­i­pal author­i­ties. The 2005 Depart­ment of Defense “Strat­egy for Home­land Defense and Civil Sup­port” explic­itly refers to the mil­i­tary sup­port the Pen­ta­gon may lend local police author­i­ties. Since the exec­u­tive who declares emer­gency pow­ers is local, to under­stand mar­tial law one must not focus on Pres­i­den­tial exec­u­tive pow­ers. The Home­land Secu­rity press release by the Secret Ser­vice dur­ing the Pitts­burgh G-20 Sum­mit described the par­tic­i­pat­ing secu­rity bod­ies as a com­bi­na­tion of “local, state, and fed­eral secu­rity,” along with “pub­lic safety and mil­i­tary partners.”

In the con­text of Amer­i­can con­sti­tu­tional law and Depart­ment of Defense pol­icy, mar­tial law emer­gency pow­ers always reside with local civil author­i­ties. Mar­tial law is not about nego­ti­at­ing checks and bal­ances of fed­eral pow­ers, how­ever. Mar­tial law emer­gency pow­ers are part of a cap­il­lary, dis­trib­u­tive sys­tem of emer­gency pow­ers in the United States and can be called into being wher­ever crowds form. Sen­a­tor David Vit­ter acted as a liai­son between Karl Rove and Louisiana Gov­er­nor Kath­leen Blanco fol­low­ing Hur­ri­cane Kat­rina, for instance, and told Blanco the George W. Bush admin­is­tra­tion wanted her to declare mar­tial law or “as close as we can get.” This exchange lays bare where the pow­ers reside.

This is the case because pres­i­den­tial author­ity is legally lim­ited. The 1878 Posse Comi­ta­tus Act with­drew north­ern troops from the south by lim­it­ing the pow­ers of the exec­u­tive to com­mand mil­i­tary troops within US bor­ders. The pres­i­dent could nonethe­less still declare a state of national emer­gency and declare nation­wide mar­tial law. Doing so, how­ever, would draw a great deal of neg­a­tive atten­tion and media. Mar­tial law pow­ers are much more flex­i­ble — and thus more tac­ti­cally use­ful — because they rely on local author­i­ties. Depart­ment of Defense mil­i­tary forces, when used domes­ti­cally, would be renamed Defense Sup­port of Civil­ian Author­i­ties (DSCA). These forces are also referred to as Civil Sup­port, which would engage “riots, acts of vio­lence, insur­rec­tions, unlaw­ful obstruc­tions or assem­blages, or other dis­or­ders prej­u­di­cial to pub­lic law and order.” These unlaw­ful assem­blages — crowds — might be dis­persed through the sim­ple act of a local author­ity. Crowds trig­ger these author­i­ties to invoke emer­gency pow­ers that are insep­a­ra­ble from the pow­ers of mar­tial law.

In the last two decades many of the laws sur­round­ing crowd con­trol came to define the actual appa­ra­tuses of fed­eral emer­gency pow­ers. Crowd con­trol laws are impor­tant because they address how secu­rity forces can inter­act with real bod­ies. This then clar­i­fies the real expres­sions and fears that moti­vate state power. The REX-84 exer­cise is an exam­ple of state poli­cies that envis­age large-scale responses to mas­sive pop­u­la­tion con­trol prob­lems. It is no acci­dent that new crowd con­trol meth­ods were included in the new civil lib­er­ties poli­cies fol­low­ing Sep­tem­ber 11. Air­port secu­rity grew. Bridge secu­rity grew. Vast deten­tion cen­ters opened in Afghanistan and Iraq. A spe­cial tor­ture camp opened in Cuba. The CIA “black sites” prison sys­tem con­tin­ued to expand.

These are all human rights crimes. In the United States, human rights and civil rights are two sep­a­rate dis­courses. It may be effec­tive to wind them together more. Since 9/11 civil lib­er­ties have come under intense assault. Polit­i­cal dis­sent in the United States has essen­tially been effec­tively crim­i­nal­ized, becom­ing in the eyes of the law just one more form of emer­gency that must be met with con­trol­ling force. Civil dis­tur­bance man­u­als used by the army claim that dis­tur­bances arise from “highly emo­tional social and eco­nomic issues,” where “eco­nom­i­cally deprived” res­i­dents are ready to release frus­tra­tions. This link between civil dis­tur­bance, eco­nomic con­di­tions, and emer­gency pow­ers received some sur­pris­ing atten­tion last Octo­ber, when Cal­i­for­nia rep­re­sen­ta­tive Brad Sher­man claimed some leg­is­la­tors were threat­ened with the specter of mar­tial law unless the bailout bill passed.

It is here that crowds, the forces of crowd con­trol, and our Con­sti­tu­tion clash. The civil lib­er­ties that have come under the most assault are free­dom of speech and assem­bly. These lib­er­ties con­flict with poli­cies about crowds and civil dis­tur­bance. Since crowds threaten pub­lic order because of their power, the response of secu­rity forces reverts back to poli­cies and laws that gov­ern civil dis­tur­bances. Civil dis­tur­bances are emer­gen­cies, and, as such, emer­gency pow­ers are in effect. Defin­ing protests as emer­gen­cies allows police con­duct that should be under­stood as unac­cept­able vio­la­tions of the con­sti­tu­tional rights of free speech and pub­lic assem­bly. When all protests and spon­ta­neous mass gath­er­ings are seen as emer­gen­cies, then the abil­ity to actu­ally prac­tice any rea­son­ably effec­tive form of mass polit­i­cal action becomes nearly impos­si­ble, lim­ited only to police and city autho­rized marches and rallies.

The per­ma­nent state of emer­gency, like the per­ma­nent war on ter­ror that the Bush admin­is­tra­tion envi­sioned, is here, stretch­ing from Kabul to Pitts­burgh. It is meant to test the bound­aries of what kinds of abuse a pop­u­la­tion will tol­er­ate against its fel­low humans and fel­low cit­i­zens. This rep­re­sents a new fash­ion of polic­ing undis­ci­plined and unpop­u­lar ide­olo­gies. It seems to make no dif­fer­ence whether one is a Mus­lim, a ter­ror­ist, an anar­chist, a com­mu­nist or just a pro­tester — one’s body is inevitably sub­ject to all kinds of forms of tem­po­rary state con­trol. For rad­i­cal Mus­lims this state con­trol can last for years of indef­i­nite deten­tion; it can also include tor­ture. For ille­gal immi­grants it might last months and some­times years. Judg­ing by Pitts­burgh and the 2004 Repub­li­can National Con­ven­tion in New York, it can last for a few days against Amer­i­can citizens.

Unfor­tu­nately, it is dif­fi­cult to direct pub­lic atten­tion to these poli­cies. The police com­mit rou­tine vio­la­tions of the law with­out pun­ish­ment because they have acquired a patri­otic armor. The same is true for Amer­i­can sol­diers. The police and the mil­i­tary elicit intense forms of devo­tion from wide inter­sec­tions of classes and eth­nic­i­ties. Focus­ing on the indi­vid­ual actions of police offi­cers is not impor­tant any­way. One need not fear crit­i­ciz­ing any indi­vid­ual police offi­cer or sol­dier. This only mys­ti­fies the prob­lem. The prob­lem is one of policy.

The fact is that under both the Amer­i­can Con­sti­tu­tion and the Uni­ver­sal Dec­la­ra­tion of Human Rights cit­i­zens have the right to assem­bly. Any new secu­rity pol­icy must reflect these rights. Crowd for­ma­tion is inevitable. No gov­ern­ment can ulti­mately con­trol col­lected human bod­ies and orga­nized crowds. Poli­cies must reflect this real­ity. Crowds too con­trol the terms of “con­sent” inher­ent in all rep­re­sen­ta­tive gov­ern­ment. Rec­og­niz­ing this will make it eas­ier to evolve the polit­i­cal sys­tems in new eco­log­i­cal and eco­nomic eras.

Posted by Justin Rogers-Cooper on Nov 27th, 2009 and filed under Political Analysis. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0. You can leave a response by filling following comment form or trackback to this entry from your site

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