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Letter from Dakar

by MBusch


Beneath a half-completed sec­tion of high­way over­pass on the dusty out­skirts of Dakar, Moussa spreads his arms widely to the con­crete slab above his head. “This is what the tycoon classes want for Sene­gal!” he announces with the­atri­cal tri­umph. “New roads for their new cars!” Then, low­er­ing his arms, he says in a deadly seri­ous tone, “But we do not need new roads. We need to eat.”

From the moment we start talk­ing pol­i­tics, Moussa – a gaunt, thirty year old cell phone tech­ni­cian whom I’ve met through a friend – insists on bring­ing me to this lonely stretch of fledg­ling infra­struc­ture to illus­trate the incon­gruity between gov­ern­ment pri­or­i­ties and the real­ity of every­day need in Sene­gal. The con­struc­tion of the country’s first tolled road con­sumes hun­dreds of mil­lions in fed­eral monies and World Bank loans, while just blocks away, ordi­nary Dakarois strug­gle to hawk trin­kets, boot­leg per­fumes and coun­ter­feit watches – all to scrounge together enough change by sun­set to pur­chase some­thing for din­ner. Moussa’s point is clear: build­ing mod­ern thor­ough­fares may be a for­ward look­ing state invest­ment, but ordi­nary Sene­galese face an imme­di­ate threat: hunger.

With soar­ing food prices in Sene­gal – a coun­try crip­pled by exter­nally imposed free trade agree­ments, stag­nant incomes and ris­ing unem­ploy­ment – if you ask every­day peo­ple to pick between invest­ing in the future and eat­ing tonight, they’ll opt for the lat­ter. As Moussa explains, “Sene­galese, we work hard but can­not afford to buy even rice any­more. Imag­ine, rice! Our main dish!” Unsur­pris­ingly, the crunch has dis­pro­por­tion­ately affected the lives of the poor, dis­grun­tled majority.

Ten­sions came to a head a last year when locals took to Dakar’s streets in protest of pre­cip­i­tously ris­ing food prices. Wear­ing t-shirts boldly pro­claim­ing “We Are Hun­gry” across the chest, hun­dreds of pro­test­ers marched down­town only to be met with tear gas and police batons. Unde­terred, activists returned a month later in sub­stan­tially greater num­bers to demand gov­ern­ment sub­si­dized food­stuffs and the president’s res­ig­na­tion. The protests have been in vain.

Since then, the sit­u­a­tion has grown worse as shock­waves from the global eco­nomic cri­sis have plagued the country’s econ­omy. Hopes that declin­ing oil prices would in turn lower the cost of agri­cul­tural com­modi­ties have not been real­ized. Last sum­mer, food prices jumped 74 per­cent in the cities, and at mar­ket today, bags of rice con­tinue to cost dou­ble the amount than a year and a half ago. More trou­bling still, peo­ple have even less money to spend than before.

After the ris­ing price of food, declin­ing remit­tances are the most seri­ous threat to Senegal’s eco­nomic sta­bil­ity,” a Dakar-based UN offi­cer tells me over break­fast one morn­ing. Speak­ing off the record in his mod­ern down­town apart­ment over­look­ing the Atlantic Ocean, he makes clear that “Local peo­ple depend on them.” While the World Bank esti­mates that remit­tances account for nearly 9 per­cent of the country’s annual GDP, the actual amounts of money flow­ing to Sene­gal from over­seas work­ers are likely dou­ble that amount.

That is, until recently. What­ever the actual num­bers, remit­tances are sharply down since the onset of the global down­turn. With Sene­galese work­ers over­seas fac­ing the threat of unem­ploy­ment and ris­ing costs of liv­ing, “Migrants are send­ing less money, or they are send­ing it less often – once every three months instead of once a month,” accord­ing to Mon­sour Tall of the UN’s Habi­tat pro­gram. Speak­ing with the BBC recently, Tall noted that “The effect is very dra­matic because the fall in remit­tances has arrived at the same time as last year’s sharp rise in prices.”

The net result finds aver­age Sene­galese hun­grier and at increased risk. UNICEF’s Sene­gal office reports that the finan­cial cri­sis has left an addi­tional 20,000 house­holds – roughly 200,000 peo­ple – with­out secure access to ade­quate amounts of food. With reduced access to food, fam­i­lies are forced to eat less fre­quently, meals are smaller, and nour­ish­ing ingre­di­ents are replaced with less healthy sub­sti­tutes. One solu­tion to com­bat these des­per­ate mea­sures lies in increased gov­ern­ment inter­ven­tion in the form of food hand­outs, credit ini­tia­tives and pro­grams to revi­tal­ize domes­tic agri­cul­tural production.

Such inter­ven­tions, of course, require sub­stan­tial invest­ment, which may not be forth­com­ing in the cur­rent inter­na­tional envi­ron­ment. Reduced for­eign aid, upon which Sene­gal relies heav­ily, is “the third threat to Senegal’s future sta­bil­ity,” my UN con­tact tells me. “It is far from clear that gov­ern­ments will con­tinue to give as in the past,” he says between bites of a crois­sant. “We will see.”

In the mean­time, tur­bu­lence marks the polit­i­cal land­scape. Sene­gal boasts a proud tra­di­tion of con­sis­tently suc­cess­ful democ­racy. The coun­try has enjoyed repeated, peace­ful tran­si­tions of power fol­low­ing elec­tions, and has never known a mil­i­tary coup. Per­haps most sig­nif­i­cantly, the gov­ern­ment recently made peace – albeit a frag­ile one – with sep­a­ratists in the south­ern reaches of Casamance. Cur­rent devel­op­ments, how­ever, have revealed cracks in what is widely con­sid­ered a solid polit­i­cal foundation.

I arrived in Sene­gal shortly after the country’s March elec­tions, a crit­i­cal round of nation­wide vot­ing marked by fears of vio­lent erup­tion. For many observers, the regional and local out­comes amounted to a ref­er­en­dum on the rul­ing party’s per­for­mance in advance of the pres­i­den­tial elec­tion in 2012. But while minor episodes of vio­lence and intim­i­da­tion were reported in the weeks before polling, elec­tion day itself passed peace­fully with­out incident.

Still, the results were a slap in the face to Pres­i­dent Abdoulaye Wade’s rul­ing Sopi party, a coali­tion that came to power in 2000 promis­ing “change” and that, up until recently, has enjoyed unprece­dented pop­u­lar­ity. Sky­rock­et­ing food costs, ris­ing unem­ploy­ment, and creep­ing sus­pi­cions that the elderly pres­i­dent is groom­ing his son Karim to assume power, how­ever, pro­duced dra­matic defeats of Sopi all across the coun­try, includ­ing in the president’s power base, Dakar.

The intro­duc­tion of Karim Wade as a pos­si­ble suc­ces­sor to his father’s office was met with pub­lic skep­ti­cism and dis­trust. It was widely assumed that Karim would take a seat on Dakar’s munic­i­pal coun­cil, then quickly rise through the regional ranks, and run for the pres­i­dency in 2012, all with­out any sig­nif­i­cant pub­lic ser­vice. Dakar’s Sopi mayor pro­moted this per­cep­tion by pub­licly promis­ing to hand over his office to Karim in the event of vic­tory. The oppo­si­tion suc­cess­fully built on this doubt by paint­ing the Wades as a monar­chy in the mak­ing, and a threat to the country’s solid polit­i­cal tradition.

This isn’t the United States,” Oumar, a civil ser­vant, tells me excit­edly as we share the back­seat of a taxi mak­ing impres­sively slow progress through down­town Dakar’s inter­minable grid­lock. “Here, the peo­ple do not allow for the son to fol­low the father into power. It does not mat­ter what Wade wants. The peo­ple decide. Sene­gal is a democracy.”

That may be, but while Sopi was taken to the clean­ers on the whole, Karim eeked out a vic­tory for his munic­i­pal seat. At the same time, the opposition’s cap­ture of a major­ity of Dakar’s local offices, includ­ing the may­or­ship, effec­tively shut the door on Karim’s polit­i­cal ambi­tions – at least for the moment. What­ever the future holds for the younger Wade, it is clear that his road to power will not be paved with pub­lic com­pla­cency. But does it matter?

Wade, not Wade, the prob­lem is the same,” Oumar says later that evening. “Life here is expen­sive.” We sit in his mod­est but beau­ti­fully dec­o­rated home where I have been invited for more talk and a bite to eat. Not sur­pris­ingly, our dis­uc­s­sion has returned to the topic of food.

In Sene­gal, we eat rice at every meal. Rice with fish, rice with chicken, rice with veg­eta­bles. And we import all of it from Asia. Sene­gal can grow rice also. We need to learn how to do it more effi­ciently.” When I ask Oumar about the prospects of gov­ern­ment sub­si­dies and loans to the country’s rice farm­ers, he agrees that state invest­ment would help. Will it ever hap­pen, I ask. “I don’t know,” he says. “It will be expen­sive, and the gov­ern­ment makes money from tax­ing the imports. It will be no dif­fer­ent afer Wade.”

Just then, Oumar’s preg­nant wife enters the room car­ry­ing a large sil­ver plat­ter heaped with a steam­ing por­tion of rice with fish. It smells divine. She places the dish on the floor, leaves, and quickly returns with a bas­ket of bread. Oumar takes a spot cross-legged next to the food, and beck­ons me to join him. “Come, let’s for­get pol­i­tics and enjoy what we have for tonight.” With that, we each tear a piece of bread from the loaf and scoop up some food from the plate. Oumar raises his up in toast, and I do the same in return. “Wel­come to Sene­gal, Michael. Bon apetit.” 

Posted by MBusch on May 14th, 2009 and filed under Political Analysis. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0. You can leave a response by filling following comment form or trackback to this entry from your site

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